Differentially Private Stochastic Coordinate Descent by Damaskinos, Georgios et al.
Differentially Private Stochastic Coordinate Descent
Georgios Damaskinos∗1 Celestine Mendler-Du¨nner∗2 Rachid Guerraoui1
Nikolaos Papandreou3 Thomas Parnell3
1E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland
{georgios.damaskinos,rachid.guerraoui}@epfl.ch
2University of California, Berkley
mendler@berkeley.edu
3IBM Research, Zurich
{npo,tpa}@zurich.ibm.com
Abstract
In this paper we tackle the challenge of making the stochastic coordinate descent algorithm differen-
tially private. Compared to the classical gradient descent algorithm where updates operate on a single
model vector and controlled noise addition to this vector suffices to hide critical information about indi-
viduals, stochastic coordinate descent crucially relies on keeping auxiliary information in memory during
training. This auxiliary information provides an additional privacy leak and poses the major challenge
addressed in this work. Driven by the insight that under independent noise addition, the consistency
of the auxiliary information holds in expectation, we present DP-SCD, the first differentially private
stochastic coordinate descent algorithm. We give a convergence analysis of our new method, analyze
its privacy-utility trade-off and demonstrate competitive performance against the popular stochastic
gradient descent alternative while requiring significantly less tuning.
1 Introduction
The availability of a huge amount of data has given rise to a plethora of machine learning (ML) applications.
The main algorithmic challenges for these applications are two-fold: (i) minimize the learning time (including
training and hyperparameter tuning) and (ii) maximize the output quality (e.g., the prediction accuracy made
by the learnt model). Stochastic coordinate descent (SCD) [27] is a very popular optimization algorithm in
both academia and industry due to its favorable convergence behavior and the absence of hyperparameters
that need to be tuned [11,13,14,15]. In particular, for training generalized linear models it is the algorithm
of choice for many applications and has been implemented as a default solver in several popular packages
such as Scikit-learn, TensorFlow and Liblinear [13].
However, SCD is not designed with privacy concerns in mind. Many applications employ sensitive data
for training a model, often in an iterative manner. Clearly, providing rigorous privacy guarantees is very
appealing. For example, a cloud infrastructure that trains ML models on sensitive data (e.g., hospital
records) can benefit from sending these models (e.g., by selling them) without the risk of leaking sensitive
information.
Differential privacy (DP) [12] is particularly well-suited for iterative ML algorithms in the presence of
a strong adversary. The composability property of DP enables a fine-grained way of measuring privacy
along with modularity for the DP mechanisms. Nevertheless, increasing the level of privacy comes at a cost:
a reduction in the predictive power of the resulting model (known as the privacy-utility trade-off ). ML
algorithms with DP guarantees typically offer hyperparameters to tune this trade-off, such as the lot size [1].
While such a knob is desirable, the tuning cost (in terms of time) grows exponentially with the number of
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additional hyperparameters (e.g., when tuning via grid search). This tuning also costs in terms of privacy
as it may employ sensitive data. Thus, ML algorithms with no additional hyperparameters (i.e., no learning
rate), such as SCD, make good candidates for DP learning. To the best of our knowledge, SCD has never
been studied through the lens of differential privacy.
Challenge. We study how existing applications, built on SCD, can be extended to guarantee differentially
private model training. Making SCD private is however not trivial due to the noise addition that is vital
for providing DP guarantees. An efficient implementation of SCD stores and updates not only the model
vector a but also an auxiliary vector v := Xa to avoid recurring computations. These vectors need to be
consistent for standard convergence results to hold. However, independent noise addition to both vectors,
necessary for DP, prohibits this consistency.
Contribution. We present DP-SCD, a differentially private version of the standard SCD algorithm [22]
and formally prove the DP guarantees. We theoretically analyze SCD under noise addition and provide a
bound on the maximum level of noise that can be tolerated to achieve a given level of utility. We empirically
show (based on real datasets) that for applications for which DP-SCD performs exact minimization per
update (e.g., ridge regression and support vector machines), DP-SCD achieves a better privacy-utility
trade-off compared to the popular differentially private stochastic gradient descent algorithm (DP-SGD [1])
while, at the same time, being free of a learning rate parameter that needs tuning. We also compare and
discuss the primal and dual formulation of SCD in the differentially private setting.
2 Preliminaries
Before we dive into the details of making SCD differentially private, we first formally define the problem
class and provide the necessary background on SCD and differential privacy.
2.1 Setup
We target the training of Generalized Linear Models (GLMs), the class of models that SCD is most popular
for. This class includes convex optimization problems with the following form.
min
θ
F(X,θ) where F(X,θ) := 1
N
N∑
i=1
`i(θ
>xi) +
λ
2
‖θ‖2 (1)
where the model vector θ is learnt from the training data X ∈ RM×N with N training examples xi ∈ RM
as columns, λ denotes the regularization parameter, and `i the convex loss functions. The norm ‖ · ‖ refers
to the L2-norm. For the rest of the paper we use the common assumption that the data examples xi are
normalized, i.e., ‖xi‖ = 1 (as in [7]), and that the loss functions `i are 1/µ-smooth. A wide range of ML
models fall into this setup including ridge regression, L2-regularized support vector machines (SVMs) and
logistic regression [22].
Threat model. We assume the threat model of [1]. We consider an adversary that has white-box access to
the training procedure (algorithm, hyperparameters, and intermediate output) and can have access even to
[· · ·xi−1,xi+1 · · · ], where xi is the data instance the adversary is targeting. However, the adversary cannot
have access to the intermediate results of any update computation. We make this assumption more explicit
in §3.1.
2.2 Primal-Dual Stochastic Coordinate Descent
The primal SCD algorithm proceeds iteratively and repeatedly selects a coordinate j ∈ [M ] at random,
solves a one dimensional auxiliary problem and updates the parameters θ:
θ+ ← θ + ejδ? where δ? = arg min
δ
F(X,θ + ejδ) (2)
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where ej denotes the unit vector with value 1 at position j. This problem often has a closed form solution;
otherwise F is generally replaced by its second order Taylor approximation.
A crucial approach for improving the time complexity of each SCD update is to keep an auxiliary vector
v := θ>X (also called the shared vector) in memory in order to avoid recurring computations, as the loss
function applies on data through the linear map θ>X (Problem 1). This auxiliary vector is updated in each
iteration as v+ ← v + δ?xi.
Dual SCD. SCD can be equivalently applied to the dual formulation of Problem 1, often referred to as
SDCA [22]. The dual optimization problem has the following objective.
min
α
F∗(X,α) where F∗(X,α) := 1
N
N∑
i=1
`∗i (−αi) +
1
2λN2
‖Xα‖2 (3)
where α ∈ RN denotes the dual model vector and `∗i the convex conjugate of the loss function `i. For the
dual problem, the auxiliary vector is v := Xα.
We use the first order optimality conditions to relate the primal and the dual model vectors as θ(α) =
1
λNXα, which leads to the important definition of the duality gap [10]:
Gap(α) := F∗(X,α) + F(X,θ(α)) = 〈Xα,θ(α)〉+ λ
2
‖θ(α)‖2 + λ
2
‖θ‖2
By the construction of the two problems, the optimal values for the objectives match in the convex setting
and the duality gap attains zero [22]. Therefore, the model θ can be learnt from solving either Problem 1 or
Problem 3, i.e., the primal and the dual problems are identical from an algorithmic perspective.
However, the primal and dual problems are quite different from a privacy perspective. When applied
to the dual, SCD computes each update by processing one example, whereas the primal SCD processes
one coordinate across all the examples. Several implications arise as differential privacy is defined on a
per-example basis.
2.3 Differentially Private Machine Learning
Differential privacy (DP) is a guarantee for a function f applied on a database of sensitive data [12]. In
the context of supervised ML, the objective function is the update function of the algorithm and the data
is typically a set of input-label pairs (xi, yi) that is used during the model training. Two input datasets
are adjacent if they differ only in a single input-label pair. Querying the model translates into making
predictions for the label of some new input.
Definition 1 (Differential privacy). A randomized mechanism M : D → R satisfies (, δ)-DP if for any
two adjacent inputs d, d′ ∈ D and for any subset of outputs S ⊆ R it holds that:
Pr[M(d) ∈ S] ≤ ePr[M(d′) ∈ S] + δ (4)
The Gaussian mechanism is a popular method for making a deterministic function f : D → R differen-
tially private (according to Definition 1). By adding Gaussian noise to the output of the function we can hide
particularities of individual input values. The resulting mechanism is defined as: M(d) := f(d) +N (0, S2fσ2)
where Sf denotes the sensitivity of the function f . This definition can be readily extended to the multi-
dimensional case in order to fit the ML setting: An iterative machine learning algorithm can be viewed as
a function f : RM×N → RM that repeatedly computes model updates from the data and thus requires a
multi-dimensional noise addition at each iteration t:
Mt(d) = f(d) +N (0, S2fσ2I), I ∈ RM×M (5)
The sensitivity is defined as:
Sf := max
adjacent d,d′
‖f(d)− f(d′)‖ (6)
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Algorithm 1: DP-SCD (for Problem 3)
Input: N examples xi ∈ RM , yi: labels, λ: regularization, T : iterations, L: mini-batch size, (, δ): DP
parameters, C: scaling factor
1 Init: α = 0 ; v = 0 ; shuffle examples xi
2 σ ← smallest noise magnitude, s.t., MA (δ, σ, L
N
, T
)
= 
3 for t = 1, 2, ...T do
4 ∆v = 0
5 Randomly sample L examples B ⊂ [N ]
6 for j ∈ B do
7 ∆j = arg min∆ F∗j (αj ,∆,v,xj)
8 ∆j /= max
(
1,
|∆j |
C
)
// scale
9 ∆v += ∆jxj
10 ∆α += ej∆j
11 end
// update the model
12 α += eB(∆α+N (0, σ22C2I1)) // I1 ∈ RL×L
13 v += ∆v +N (0, σ22C2I2) // I2 ∈ RM×M
14 end
15 return θ = 1
λN
v // retrieve primal model
DP-SGD. SGD used for solving Problem 1, is an example of how the Gaussian mechanism can be ap-
plied to make ML differentially private. SGD iteratively updates the model vector as θ+ ← θ − ηgξ with
gξ :=
1
|ξ|
∑
i∈ξ∇`i(θ>xi)>xi + λθ and η denoting the learning rate. SGD can be made differentially private
by using the Gaussian mechanism. In particular, DP-SGD adds noise to each update with the variance given
by the sensitivity of the update function, i.e., Sf = ‖gξ‖ for our example. In practice, an additional gradient
clipping step enforces a desired bound on the sensitivity Sf [1].
Privacy accounting. Measuring the privacy leakage of a randomized mechanism M boils down to com-
puting (, δ), i.e., computing a bound for the privacy loss () that holds with certain probability (δ). In
the context of ML, M often consists of a sequence of mechanisms Mi that, for example, denote the model
update at each iteration i. All these mechanisms have the same pattern in terms of sensitive (training) data
access for most iterative ML algorithms, including SCD. Computing (, δ) given the individual pairs (i, δi)
is a problem known as composability. The moments accountant [1] is an important method that computes
tighter bounds for the privacy loss (i.e., tighter (, δ)) compared to the standard composition theorems. This
method is tailored to the Gaussian mechanism and employs the log moment of eachMi to derive the bound
of the total privacy loss. The moments accountant can be viewed as a function that returns the privacy loss
bound:  = MA(δ, σ, q, T ), where σ is the noise magnitude, q is the sampling ratio (i.e., the ratio of the data
that each Mi uses over the total data), and T is the number of individual mechanisms Mi [1].
3 Differentially Private Stochastic Coordinate Descent
We focus on the dual problem formulation (Problem 3) and summarize our main differentially private
stochastic coordinate descent algorithm (DP-SCD) in Algorithm 1. The crucial extension in comparison
with the standard dual SCD (SDCA [22]) is that we consider mini-batch based updates, that independently
process a random sample of L coordinates (B) in each inner iteration (Steps 6-11). This is not only be-
neficial from a performance perspective, as the updates can be executed in parallel, but it also serves as a
hyperparameter that steers the privacy-utility trade-off of our algorithm (similar to the lot size in [1]). We
formalize our parallel updates based on [15]. In particular, we reuse the local subproblem formulation for
the special case where each parallel process updates only a single example j ∈ B.
F∗j (αj ,∆,v,xj) :=
1
N
`∗j (−αj −∆) +
1
2λN2
(
1
L
‖v‖2 + 2v>xj∆ + L‖xj‖2∆2
)
(7)
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Note that the minimizer ∆j in Step 7 can be often computed in closed form, e.g., for ridge regression, or
SVMs. Exact minimization is however not necessary for our algorithm to converge. Approximate solutions
are sufficient for convergence (e.g., [23, Assumption 1]). Hence, for logistic regression we use a single Newton
step to efficiently update the coordinates.
Finally, to guarantee differential privacy, we bound the sensitivity of each coordinate update to be C
by scaling ∆j (Step 8). We then use the Gaussian mechanism to make α and v differentially private. We
address two main questions regarding DP-SCD:
1. How much noise do we need to add to guarantee (, δ)-differential privacy? (§3.1)
2. Can we still give convergence guarantees for this new algorithm under noise addition? (§4)
We answer the first question in §3.1 by analyzing the sensitivity of our update function. For the second
question (that we answer in §4), the main challenge is that independent noise addition destroys the consist-
ency between α and v, i.e., v 6= Xα. We show how to address this challenge and prove convergence for our
method.
3.1 Privacy Analysis
We view the training procedure as a sequence of mechanismsMt where each mechanism corresponds to one
outer iteration and computes an update on L examples. We assume these mechanisms to be atomic from an
adversary point of view, i.e., we assume no access to the individual coordinate updates. For determining the
sensitivity of this mechanism it is important to note that all updates within mechanismMt touch different
data points and are computed independently. The output of each mechanism Mt is the concatenation
[α>,v>] of the dual and the auxiliary vectors. The sensitivity of the output is given as:
Lemma 1 (Sensitivity of DP-SCD). The sensitivity of each mechanism Mt in Algorithm 1 is bounded:
Sf ≤
√
2C.
Proof. Each mini-batch processing accesses sensitive information and thus needs to have DP guarantees.
The input of each mini-batch processing consists of α and v and the output consists of the updates, i.e.,
f = [∆1, · · · ,∆L,
∑
B∆v] ∈ RL+M .
The sensitivity with respect to a single example is bounded by Step 8 of Algorithm 1. Given that |∆i| ≤ C
(per-example scaling) and ‖xi‖ ≤ 1 (normalized data), it holds that ‖∆v‖ ≤ ‖xi‖ ∗ |∆i| ≤ C. Hence, the
sensitivity of f is as follows. Assume X \X ′ = xk:
f(X) = [∆1, · · · ,∆k, · · · ,∆L,∆v1 + · · ·+ ∆vk + · · ·+ ∆vL] ∈ RL+M
f(X ′) = [∆1, · · · , 0, · · · ,∆L,∆v1 + · · ·+ 0 + · · ·+ ∆vL] ∈ RL+M
S2f := max
X\X′=xk
‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖2 = ‖[0, · · · ,∆k, · · · , 0,∆vk]‖2 = ∆2k + ‖∆vk‖2 ≤ C2 + C2 = 2C2
Theorem 1 (Privacy bound for DP-SCD). Algorithm 1 is (, δ) differentially private for any  = O (q2T )
and δ > 0 if we choose σ = Ω
(
q
√
T ln(1/δ)

)
.
Proof. Each mini-batch processing (Steps 6-11) accesses sensitive information and thus needs to have DP
guarantees. We make the output of each mini-batch processing differentially private by using the Gaussian
mechanism (Equation 5) with M replaced by M + L in our case. The moments of each mechanismMi
are bounded (given Lemma 1 and [1, Lemma 3]). Hence, based on [1, Theorem 1], we can derive the lower
bound for σ that guarantees (, δ)-DP for the output model.
In practice, we choose the smallest σ that provides the given privacy guarantee, i.e.,
MA
(
δ, σ,
L
N
, T
)
≤  (8)
where T denotes the iterations of Algorithm 1. Given that  decreases monotonically with increasing σ, we
perform binary search until the variance of the output of the MA gets smaller than 1% of the given .
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Data-dependent constraints. The update computation involves certain dataset-dependent constraints
for applications such as logistic regression or SVMs. For example, logistic regression employs the labels to
ensure that the logarithms in the delta computation are properly defined [22]. The noise addition breaks
these constraints. An approach that enforces these constraints after the noise addition would leak privacy
and break the DP guarantee. We thus enforce these constraints in the beginning of the delta computation.
As a result, the output model does not respect these constraints (as opposed to SCD). Nevertheless, there
are no negative implications as the purpose of these constraints is to enable valid delta computations.
3.2 Cost Analysis
The performance overhead of DP-SCD with respect to SCD boils down to the cost of sampling the Gaussian
distribution. This cost is proportional to the mini-batch size, i.e., larger size means less frequent noise
additions and less frequent sampling. The noise addition also prohibits any performance optimizations that
accelerate training for sparse datasets.
The time complexity for Algorithm 1 is O(T ·M). The updates for the coordinates with a given mini-batch
can be parallelized. We discuss parallelizable variants of SCD in §6.
3.3 Primal Version
The primal formulation of DP-SCD (shown in Algorithm 2) computes the updates in a coordinate-wise
manner, thus making differentially private learning more challenging than in the dual formulation. At each
iteration of the inner loop (similar to Steps 6-11 of Algorithm 1) the primal version updates a given coordinate
j for all the examples. Therefore, the sampling ratio (q) is 1 as each ∆-computation touches one coordinate
of the entire dataset. This invalidates the important property of the mini-batch size (L) to regulate the
privacy-utility trade-off. Additionally, the noise addition to make the primal version DP is significantly
larger than the dual version.
Algorithm 2: primalDP-SCD (for Problem 1)
Input: S: sample size, same input as Algorithm 1
1 Init: θ = 0 ; v = 0 ; shuffle examples xi
2 σ ← smallest noise magnitude, s.t., MA (δ, σ, 1, T ) = 
3 for t = 1, 2, · · ·T do
4 ∆v = 0
5 Randomly a block of L coordinates B ⊂ [M ]
6 for j ∈ B do
7 ∆j = arg min∆ Fj(θj ,∆,v,X[j, :]) // update
8 ∆j /= max
(
1,
|∆j |
C
)
// scale
9 ∆v += ∆jX[j, :]
10 ∆θ += ej∆j
11 end
// update the model
12 θ += eB(∆θ +N (0, σ2(4L2 − 2)C2I1)) // I1 ∈ RL×L
13 v += ∆v +N (0, σ2(4L2 − 2)C2I2) // I2 ∈ RN×N
14 end
15 return θ // DP model
Each mini-batch processing accesses sensitive information and thus needs to have DP guarantees. We
device the primalDP-SCD by assuming that the norm of each row of X (i.e., a given coordinate for all the
examples) instead of each column, is bounded (‖X[j, :]‖ = 1).
Lemma 2 (Sensitivity of primalDP-SCD). The sensitivity of each mechanism Mt in Algorithm 2 is
bounded: Sf ≤
√
(4L2 − 2)C.
Proof. The input of each mini-batch processing consists of θ and v and the output consists of the updates,
i.e., f = [∆1, · · · ,∆L,
∑
B∆v] ∈ RL+N . The sensitivity with respect to a single example is bounded by
6
Step 8 of Algorithm 2 which ensures |∆j | ≤ C (per-example scaling). Moreover, given the normalized data,
it holds that ‖∆v‖ ≤ ‖X[j, ξ]‖ ∗∆j ≤ C. Hence the sensitivity of f can be computed by choosing X,X ′
such that ‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖2 is maximized. The sensitivity is maximized when X \X ′ = x0:
f(X) = [∆1,∆2, · · · ,∆L,∆v1 + ∆v2 + · · ·+ ∆vL] ∈ RL+N
f(X ′) = [0,∆′2, · · · ,∆′L, 0 + ∆v′2 + · · ·+ ∆v′L] ∈ RL+N
The difference among f(X),f(X ′) is the result of the difference due to the missing example for X ′ that
affects all the updates as each update employs all the examples for coordinate j. Moreover, the subsequent
values-vectors can, in the worst case, be opposite. Therefore, the sensitivity is as follows by using the triangle
inequality.
S2f := max
X\X′=xk
‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖2
= ‖[∆1,∆2 −∆′2, · · · ,∆L −∆′L,∆v1 + ∆v2 −∆v′2 + · · ·+ ∆vL −∆v′L]‖2
= |∆1|2 + |∆2 −∆′2|2 + · · ·+ |∆L −∆′L|2 + (‖∆v1 + ∆v2 −∆v′2 + · · ·+ ∆vL −∆v′L‖)2
≤ |∆1|2 + (|∆2|+ |∆′2|)2 + · · ·+ (|∆L|+ |∆′L|)2 + (‖∆v1‖+ ‖∆v2‖+ ‖∆v′2‖+ · · ·+ ‖∆vL‖+ ‖∆v′L‖)2
≤ C2 + 4C2 + · · ·+ 4C2 + (C + 2C + · · ·+ 2C)2
= (4L− 3)C2 + (2L− 1)2C2 = (4L2 − 2)C2
We therefore conclude that the dual version (Algorithm 1) is preferable over the primal in the DP setting.
3.4 Sequential version
We present a baseline algorithm namely seqDP-SCD to depict the importance of independent updates (in-
side a given mini-batch) forDP-SCD, and focus on the dual problem. As shown in Algorithm 3, seqDP-SCD
adopts the natural (i.e., as in vanilla SCD) method of performing sequential and thus correlated updates.
In particular, the updates for both α and v at sample j (Steps 10 and 11 of Algorithm 3) depend on all the
previous samples of the same mini-batch (B). In contrast, in our main DP-SCD algorithm (Algorithm 1),
there is no such correlation and the updates can be also executed in parallel. On the one hand this correlation
is better for convergence in terms of iterations (not time) [14]. On the other hand, due to this correlation,
Algorithm 3 requires significantly more noise than Algorithm 1 that makes the overall performance of our
proposed algorithm (Algorithm 1) significantly better as we show in §5.
Algorithm 3: seqDP-SCD (for Problem 3)
// same as Steps 1-3 of Algorithm 1
3 for t = 1, 2, ...T do
4 ∆v = 0
5 Randomly sample L examples B ⊂ [N ]
6 for j ∈ B do
7 ∆j = arg min∆ F∗j (αj ,∆,v,xj)
8 ∆j /= max
(
1,
|∆j |
C
)
// scale
9 ∆v += ∆jxj
10 α += ej∆j // update the model
11 v += ∆v
12 end
// add noise
13 α += eBN (0, σ2(4L2 − 2)C2I1) // I1 ∈ RL×L
14 v +=N (0, σ2(4L2 − 2)C2I2) // I2 ∈ RM×M
15 end
16 return θ = 1
λN
v // retrieve primal model
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Lemma 3 (Sensitivity of seqDP-SCD). The sensitivity of each mechanismMt in Algorithm 3 is bounded:
Sf ≤
√
(4L2 − 2)C.
Proof. The proof is similar to Lemma 2. The difference among f(X),f(X ′) consists of (a) the difference due
to the missing example for X ′ and (b) the difference due to all the subsequent values (correlated updates).
Moreover, the subsequent values-vectors can, in the worst case, be opposite. Therefore, the sensitivity follows
by using the triangle inequality.
4 Convergence Analysis
We recall the main challenge for generalizing the convergence guarantees of SCD to DP-SCD, namely
the need to handle potential inconsistencies between the auxiliary vector v and the model vector α, i.e.,
v 6= Xα. Note that a variant of Algorithm 1 that only updates α and recomputes v in every iteration
would overcome this issue. However, such a variant involves two disadvantages that make it impractical: (i)
significant computational overhead and (ii) on the final step this variant would need to employ the entire
dataset to map the dual model to the primal model (θ := 1λNXα), which creates a massive privacy leakage
and alleviates the effect of the mini-batch (i.e., q=1 for the moments accountant).
To analyze the convergence of Algorithm 1 we split each mini-batch iteration of Algorithm 1 in two steps:
(i) the update step includes the computation of L coordinate updates (Steps 6-11) and (ii) the perturbation
step adds Gaussian noise to the two vectors α and v independently (Steps 12 and 13).
We base our analysis on [15] and thus include the parameters γ and σ′ (not related to the standard
deviation of the noise σ) for ease of analysis. We specify our general result to the case of Algorithm 1 by
setting γ = 1 and σ′ = L. We therefore consider the following privacy preserving model sequence {α}i with
intermediate, non-public models {αˆ}i. The corresponding sequence for {v}i can be derived in a similar way.
α0 → αˆ1 := α0 + γ
L∑
j=1
∆α0,j → α1 := αˆ1 + ηα,1
→ αˆ2 := α1 + γ
L∑
j=1
∆α1,j → . . .
→ αn := α0 + γ
n−1∑
i=1
∆αi +
n−1∑
i=1
ηα,i
(9)
Here, η ∼ N (0, σ2) is Gaussian noise added to preserve privacy and ∆αi :=
∑L
j=1 ∆αi,j with
∆αi,j = arg min∆ F∗(αi + ej∆).
To analyze the convergence behavior of Algorithm 1, we consider the two intermediate steps αi → αˆi+1
(update step) and αˆi+1 → αi+1 (perturbation step) separately. The main idea is to show that:
(i) αi → αˆi+1 decreases the objective even if the update is computed based on a noisy version of α,v.
(ii) the damage on the objective when adding noise and going from αˆi+1 → αi+1 is bounded.
The intuition is that as long as the damage is smaller than the gain achieved with the update, the objective
decreases and thus the algorithm converges.
The key observation that allows us to derive convergence guarantees in this setting is the following.
Remark 1 (Consistency in expectation). Algorithm 1 preserves the consistency between α and v in expect-
ation, i.e., E[v] = XE[α].
Proof. This follows from the construction of the model updates and the independent noise with zero mean
that is added to both sequences {α}i, {v}i.
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4.1 Update Step
Each iteration of Algorithm 1 computes a mini-batch update ∆α that is applied to the model α and indirectly
to the auxiliary vector v in Steps 12 and 13 respectively. We denote by
•
∆α the unscaled version of this
update, i.e., the update computed excluding Step 8. We add this step back later in our analysis. Lemma 4
gives a lower bound for the decrease in the objective achieved by performing this update even if
•
∆α is
computed based on noisy versions of α,v where E[v] = E[Xα] but v 6= Xα.
Lemma 4 (Update step - objective decrease lower bound). Assuming `i are 1/µ-smooth, then the update
step of Algorithm 1 decreases the objective, even if computed based on a noisy version of α,v. The decrease
is as follows:
E[S(α)− S(α+ •∆α)] ≥ µλL
µλN + L
E[S(α)] (10)
where S denotes the dual suboptimality defined as: S(α) := F∗(α)−minα F∗(α).
Proof. Consider the optimization step αi → αˆi+1 (Sequence 9) that employs a set of unscaled updates
(
•
∆αj). Given the µ-strong convexity of `
∗
i (follows from 1/µ-smoothness of `i), the decrease in the dual
objective is:
∆F := F∗(α)−min•
∆αj
F∗(α+ γ
L∑
j=1
ej
•
∆αj)
≥ F∗(α)−F∗(α+ γ
L∑
j=1
ej
•
∆αj) ∀
•
∆αj ∈ R
[15, Lemma 3]
= F∗(α)− (1− γ)F∗(α)− γ
L∑
i=1
Gσ′j (
•
∆αj ;v, αj)
= γ
(
F∗(α)−
L∑
i=1
Gσ′j (
•
∆αj ;v, αj)
)
where Gσ′j is the subproblem that each parallel loop is solving:
Gσ′j := 1
N
`∗j (−αj −
•
∆αj) +
1
L
1
2λN2
‖v‖2 + σ
′
2λN2
‖xj
•
∆αj‖2 + 1
λN2
x>j v
•
∆αj
Therefore:
1
γ
∆F =
1
N
L∑
j=1
`∗j (−αj) + 1
2λN2
‖v‖2 − 1
N
L∑
j=1
`∗j (−(αj +
•
∆αj))− 1
2λN2
‖v‖2 − σ
′
2λN2
L∑
j=1
‖xj
•
∆αj‖2 − 1
λN2
L∑
j=1
x>j v
•
∆αj
Consider
•
∆αj := s(uj −αj) for any s ∈ (0, 1] and for uj = −∇j`j
(
1
λNx
>
j E[v]
)
. In some sense, s denotes
the deviation from the “optimal”
•
∆-value (uj − aj). Hence we have:
N
γ
∆F ≥
L∑
j=1
(
`∗j (−αj)− `∗j (−(αj + s(uj − αj)))
)− σ′
2λN
L∑
j=1
‖xjs(uj − aj)‖2 − 1
λN
L∑
j=1
x>j vs(uj − aj)
By the µ-strong convexity of `∗i (follows from 1/µ-smoothness of `i) we have:
`∗j (−(αj + s(uj − αj))) = `∗j (s(−uj) + (1− s)(−aj)) ≤ s`∗j (−uj) + (1− s)`∗j (−aj)− µ
2
s(1− s)(uj − aj)2
Hence we have:
N
γ
∆F ≥
L∑
j=1
(
`∗j (−αj)− s`∗j (−uj)− (1− s)`∗j (−αj) + µ
2
s(1− s)(uj − αj)2
)
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−
L∑
j=1
(
σ′s2(uj − αj)2
2λN
‖xj‖2 + 1
λN
x>j vs(uj − αj)
)
=
L∑
j=1
(
−s`∗j (−uj) + s`∗j (−αj) + µ
2
s(1− s)(uj − αj)2 − σ
′s2(uj − αj)2
2λN
‖xj‖2 − 1
λN
x>j vs(uj − αj)
)
By taking the expectation w.r.t. the randomization in the noise, using Jensen’s inequality for convex
functions (E[`∗j (x)] ≥ `∗j (E[x])), the fact that σ2 = E[α2j ]− E[αj ]2 and the fact that the noise on α and v is
independent we have:
N
γ
E[∆F ] ≥
L∑
j=1
(
−sE[`∗j (−uj)] + sE[`∗j (−αj)] + µ
2
s(1− s)E[(uj − αj)2]
− σ
′s2
2λN
E[(uj − αj)2]‖xj‖2 − s
λN
x>j E[v](uj − E[αj ])
)
≥
L∑
j=1
(
−s`∗j (−uj) + sE[`∗j (−αj)]− s
λN
x>j E[v](uj − E[αj ])
+
(
µ
2
s(1− s)− σ
′s2
2λN
‖xj‖2
)
(u2j − 2ujE[αj ] + E[α2j ])
)
≥
L∑
j=1
(
−s`∗j (−uj) + sE[`∗j (−αj)] + s
λN
x>j E[v]E[αj ]
− s
λN
x>j E[v]uj +
(
µ
2
s(1− s)− σ
′s2
2λN
‖xj‖2
)
(u2j − 2ujE[αj ] + E[αj ]2 + σ2)
)
The following is the Fenchel-Young inequality that holds as equality given uj = −∇j`j
(
1
λNx
>
j E[v]
)
:
`j
(
1
λN
x>j E[v]
)
+ `∗j (−uj) = − 1
λN
x>j E[v]uj
Hence we have:
N
γ
E[∆F ] ≥
L∑
j=1
(
s`j
(
1
λN
x>j E[v]
)
+ sE[`∗j (−αj)] + s
λN
x>j E[v]E[αj ]
+
(
µ
2
s(1− s)− σ
′s2
2λN
‖xj‖2
)
(u2j − 2ujE[αj ] + E[αj ]2 + σ2)
)
(11)
We then employ the definition of the duality gap (Gap(α) := F(θ(α))− (−F∗(α))) and take the expect-
ation w.r.t. the randomization in the noise along with the Jensen inequality for convex functions.
E[Gap(α)] = F(θ(E[α]))− (−E[F∗(α)]) = 1
N
N∑
j=1
(
`j(x
>
j θ) + E[`∗j (−αj)]
)
+
λ
2
‖θ(E[α])‖2 + 1
2λN2
‖XE[α]‖2
We then apply the Fenchel-Young inequality:
g(θ(E[α])) + g∗(XE[(α]) ≥ θ(E[α])>XE[α]
⇔ λ
2
‖θ(E[α])‖2 + 1
2λN2
‖XE[α]‖2 ≥ 1
λN
E[v]>XE[α]
The above inequality holds as equality in light of Remark 1 and the primal-dual map. Therefore by using
uniform mini-batch sampling the duality gap becomes:
E[Gap(α)] = 1
N
N∑
j=1
(
`j(x
>
j θ) + E[`∗j (−αj)] + 1
λN
E[αj ]x>j E[v]
)
10
=
1
N
N
L
L∑
j=1
(
`j(x
>
j θ) + E[`∗j (−αj)] + 1
λN
E[αj ]x>j E[v]
)
=
1
L
L∑
j=1
(
`j(x
>
j θ) + E[`∗j (−αj)] + 1
λN
E[αj ]x>j E[v]
)
By extracting these terms in Inequality 11, the bound simplifies:
N
γ
E[∆F ] ≥ sL · E[Gap(α)] +
L∑
j=1
(µ
2
s(1− s) − σ
′s2
2λN
‖xj‖2
)
(u2j − 2ujE[αj ] + E[αj ]2 + σ2)
Then by using ‖xj‖2 = 1 and Gap(α) ≥ S(α) we get:
E[∆F ] = E[S(α)]− E[S(α+ γ
L∑
j=1
•
∆αj)]
≥ sLγ
N
E[S(α)] + σ
′γs2
2λN2
(
µλ(1− s)N
sσ′
− 1
) L∑
j=1
(
(uj − E[αj ])2 + σ2
)
σ′=L,γ=1
=
sL
N
E[S(α)] + Ls
2
2λN2
(
µλ(1− s)N
sL
− 1
) L∑
j=1
(
(uj − E[αj ])2 + σ2
)
s= µλN
µλN+L
=
µλL
µλN + L
E[S(α)]
Thus as long as E[α] is not equal α? we can expect a decrease in the objective from computing an update
•
∆ based on the noisy α,v.
Scaling. When computing the update ∆α in Algorithm 1, each coordinate of
•
∆α is scaled to a maximum
magnitude of C (Step 8) in order to bound the sensitivity of each update step. In strong contrast to SGD,
where this scaling step destroys the unbiasedness of the gradients and thus classical convergence guarantees
no longer hold, for DP-SCD the scaling only translates into a smaller function decrease. This is a remarkable
property of SCD when analyzed in the DP setting.
To incorporate scaling into our analysis we use the following inequality which is guaranteed to hold for
some κ ∈ [0, 1) due to the convexity of the objective.
S(α+ ∆α) ≤ (1− κ)S(α+ •∆α) + κS(α)
⇔E[S(α)− S(α+ ∆α)] ≥ (1− κ)E[S(α)− S(α+ •∆α)] (12)
The scaling step (Step 8 of Algorithm 1) preserves the linear convergence of Lemma 4 and decreases the rate
by a factor of (1− κ). Note that for κ = 0 (i.e., no scaling) the solution is exact and the smaller the scaling
factor C, the larger the κ.
4.2 Perturbation Step
To prove the convergence of DP-SCD (Algorithm 1), it remains to show that adding noise at the end of each
mini-batch update is not increasing the objective more than the decrease achieved by the rescaled update
∆α.
Lemma 5 (Perturbation step - objective increase upper bound). Assume `∗i are ν-smooth. Then, the
perturbation step of Algorithm 1 increases the objective by at most:
E[|S(α+ ∆α+ η)− S(α+ ∆α)|] ≤ 1
2
(
ν +
1
λN2
)
Lσ2 (13)
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Proof. Given that `∗i is ν-smooth and the regularization term of F∗ (Problem 3) is 1λN2 -smooth, F∗ is
ν′ = ν+ 1λN2 smooth. We thus have F∗(α+ ∆α+ η) ≤ F∗(α+ ∆α) + η>∇F∗ + ν
′
2 ‖η‖2. We then subtract
mina F∗(α) on both sides and take expectations w.r.t the randomness in the perturbation noise. The claim
follows from E[η] = 0 and E[‖η‖2] = Lσ2.
Combining Inequality 12, Lemmas 4 and 5 yields our main result stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Utility guarantee for Algorithm 1). Suppose that `i is 1/µ-smooth and ν-strongly
convex. If we choose L, C such that L(2(1− κ)µλ− 1) > µλN for κ ∈ (0, 1), and T such that
T = O
(
log
(
N22
(ν+ 1
λN2
)L3 ln(1/δ)
))
, then the utility of Algorithm 1 is bounded:
E[S(α(T ))] ≤ O
((
ν +
1
λN2
)
L3 log
(
N(
ν + 1
λN2
)
L
)
ln (1/δ) /(N22)
)
(14)
Proof. We reorder terms in Inequality 13 and subtract S(α) on both sides. We then combine Inequalities 10
and 12 and get that the suboptimality decreases per round by:
E[S(α)− S(α+ ∆α+ η)] ≥ (1− κ)µλL
µλN + L
E[S(α)]− 1
2
(
ν +
1
λN2
)
Lσ2
At iteration t we thus have:
E[S(α(t−1))]− E[S(α(t))] ≥ (1− κ)µλL
µλN + L
E[S(α(t−1)))]− 1
2
(
ν +
1
λN2
)
Lσ2
⇔ E[S(α(t))] ≤
(
1− (1− κ)µλL
µλN + L
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
E[S(α(t−1)))] + 1
2
(
ν +
1
λN2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ν′
Lσ2
We apply the previous inequality recursively and get:
E[S(α(T ))] ≤ ATE[S(α(0)))] +O (ν′Lσ2)
Theorem 1≤ ATE[S(α(0)))] +O
(
ν′L3T ln(1/δ)
N22
)
If we choose L and C such that A < 12 ⇔ L(2(1 − κ)µλ − 1) > µλN and T such that T =
O
(
log
(
N22
ν′L3 ln(1/δ)
))
, we get the bound on the utility:
E[S(α(T ))] ≤ O
(
ν′L3 ln(1/δ)
N22
)
+O
(
ν′L3T ln(1/δ)
N22
)
By omitting the ln term the bound on T simplifies as: T = O (log ( Nν′L)). Hence the utility bound
becomes:
E[S(α(T ))] ≤ O
((
ν +
1
λN2
)
L3 log
(
N(
ν + 1
λN2
)
L
)
ln (1/δ) /(N22)
)
The suboptimality is proportional to the magnitude of the noise and hence, finding the exact minimizer
requires σ → 0 (i.e., →∞). The smaller the σ the larger the  and thus the less private the learning is.
We empirically confirm that DP-SCD converges smoother with a smaller σ in §5.
Theorem 2 constitutes the first analysis of coordinate descent in the differentially private setting and it
can be a stepping stone for future theoretical results in this setting as we discuss in §7.
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5 Experiments
Our empirical results compare our new DP-SCD algorithm (Algorithm 1) against SCD, SGD, DP-SGD. We
include seqDP-SCD (Algorithm 3) as a baseline, to depict the importance of independent updates (inside
a given mini-batch) for DP-SCD. We test the performance on three popular applications that belong to
GLMs (§2.1), namely ridge regression, logistic regression and SVMs.
5.1 Setup
Datasets. We employ public real datasets. In particular, we report on YearPredictionMSD1 for ridge
regression, Phishing2 for logistic regression, and Adult3 for SVMs. We preprocess each dataset by scaling
each coordinate by its maximum absolute value, followed by scaling each example to unit norm (normalized
data). For YearPredictionMSD we center the labels at the origin. Based on [4] and regarding Adult, we
convert the categorical variables to dummy/indicator ones and replace the missing values with the most
frequently occurring value of the corresponding feature. We employ a training/test split for our data, to
train and test the performance of our algorithms. YearPredictionMSD and Adult include a separate training
and test set file. Phishing consists of a single file that we split with 75%:25% ratio into a training and a test
set. Finally, we hold-out a random 25% of the training set for tuning the hyperparameters (validation set).
The resulting training/validation/test size is {347786/115929/51630, 24420/8141/16281, 6218/2073/2764}
and the number of coordinates are {90, 81, 68} for {YearPredictionMSD, Adult, Phishing} respectively.
Performance metrics. Accuracy measures the classification performance as the fraction of correct predic-
tions among all the predictions. The larger the accuracy, the better the utility. Mean squared error (MSE)
measures the prediction error as: MSE = 1N
∑N
i=1(Yˆi − Yi)2 where Yˆi is the predicted value and Yi is the
actual value. The lower the MSE, the better the utility. We quantify convergence by showing the decrease
in the primal objective (F(X(training),θ) from Problem 1) on the training set.
Hyperparameters. We fix λ to 10−4 for YearPredictionMSD and Phishing and to 10−5 for the Adult
dataset based on the best performance of SCD and SGD for a range of λ ∈ {10−8, 10−7, · · · , 1, 10, · · · , 108}.
For a fair comparison of the DP algorithms, the iterations need to be fixed. Based on [28], we test the
DP algorithms for {5, 10, 50} epochs and fix the number of iterations to T = 50N (i.e., 50 epochs) for
YearPredictionMSD and T = 10N for the other datasets. Based on [26,29], we vary  in {0.1, 0.5, 1, 2} and
fix δ = 0.001. We choose the other hyperparameters by selecting the combination with the best performance
(lowest MSE for ridge regression and largest accuracy for logistic regression and SVMs) on the validation
set. The range of tested values is as follows.
• C, η ∈ {10−8, 10−7, · · · , 1, · · · , 104}
• |ξ|, L ∈ {0, 5, 10, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, 1250, 1500, 1750, 2000}
Deployment. We run our experiments on commodity Linux machines. There are no special hardware
requirements for our code other than enough RAM to load the datasets. We report the median result across
10 different runs by changing the seeding, i.e., the randomization due to initialization, sampling and Gaussian
noise.
5.2 Results
Tuning cost. The hyperparameters of seqDP-SCD, DP-SCD, SGD, DP-SGD are (L,C), (L,C), (η, |ξ|),
(η, L,C) respectively; SCD requires no tuning. We tested a total of 156 configurations for DP-SCD as
opposed to a total of 2028 for DP-SGD. For large-scale datasets that require significant amount of training
time and resources, the difference in the number of hyperparameters constitutes an appealing property of
1https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvmtools/datasets/regression.html
2https://www.csie.ntu.edu.tw/~cjlin/libsvmtools/datasets/binary.html
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
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Figure 1: Privacy-utility trade-off. Better utility means lower MSE or larger accuracy. DP-SCD outperforms
DP-SGD for the applications that enable exact update steps (namely ridge regression and SVMs) despite
DP-SCD having less hyperparameters.
DP-SCD. Noteworthy, the SGD tuning is not useful for the DP-SGD tuning as the best choice for η depends
on the choice of C [25].
Privacy-utility trade-off. Figure 1 quantifies the trade-off between privacy and utility for different pri-
vacy levels (i.e.,  values). We observe that seqDP-SCD has the worst performance due to the significantly
larger noise compared to the other algorithms. DP-SCD performs better than DP-SGD for ridge regression
and SVMs, and worse for logistic regression, that can be attributed to the following. On the one hand,
DP-SCD requires
√
2 more noise than DP-SGD (for the same privacy guarantee) due to the need of a
shared vector (§3). On the other hand, each update of DP-SCD finds an exact solution to the minimization
problem for ridge regression and SVMs and an approximate one for logistic regression, whereas DP-SGD
takes a direction opposite to the gradient. Apparently, the steps of DP-SCD in the case of ridge regression
and SVMs are more precise despite suffering more noise than DP-SGD.
Convergence. Figure 2 shows the impact of noise on the convergence behavior for the DP algorithms on
the YearPredictionMSD dataset. In particular, for a given , we select the best (in terms of validation MSE)
configuration (also used in Figure 1(a)), and measure the decrease in the objective with respect to epochs
(not time as that would be implementation-dependent). We empirically verify the results of Theorem 2 by
observing that the distance between the convergence point and the optimum depends on the level of privacy.
Moreover, DP-SCD and DP-SGD converge with similar speed for  = 0.1. Decreasing the amount of noise
( = 1), makes DP-SCD converge almost as fast as SGD and with more stability comparing to  = 0.1.
This is aligned with the results of §4, i.e., the fact that the larger amount of noise (decrease in ) makes the
decrease in the suboptimality more noisy.
Mini-batch size. The mini-batch size is an important parameter for DP-SCD that affects the privacy-
utility trade-off while also controls the level of parallelism (§3). Figure 3 shows that the utility improves
(i.e., MSE drops) as the mini-batch size increases till a saturation point. The larger the noise, the smaller
the value of this saturation point (L = 1000 for  = 0.1 and L = 2000 for  = 1). We observe that increasing
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Figure 2: Impact of noise on convergence. Differential privacy does not prevent convergence but increases
the noise in reducing the objective and the distance to the optimum (aligned with the result of Theorem 2).
the level of parallelism can only improve the utility of DP-SCD thus making our algorithm suitable for
large-scale parallel processing.
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Figure 3: Impact of mini-batch size on utility for DP-SCD. Utility increases with increasing mini-batch
size, till a saturation point that depends on the level of privacy.
6 Related Work
Perturbation methods for DP. Existing works achieve differentially private ML by perturbing the query
output (i.e., model prediction). These works target both convex and non-convex optimization algorithms and
focus on a specific application [6,17], a subclass of optimization functions (properties of the loss function) [7]
or a particular optimization algorithm [1,24]. These approaches can be divided into three main classes. The
first class involves input perturbation approaches that add noise to the input data [9]. These approaches are
easy to implement but often prohibit the ML model from providing accurate predictions. The second class
involves output perturbation approaches that add noise to the model after the training procedure finishes, i.e.,
without modifying the vanilla training algorithm. This noise addition can be model-specific [28] or model-
agnostic [2,18]. The third class involves inner perturbation approaches that modify the learning algorithm
such that the noise is injected during learning. One method for inner perturbation is to modify the objective
of the training procedure [7]. Another approach involves adding noise to the output of each update step of
the training without modifying the objective [1]. Our new DP-SCD algorithm belongs to the third class.
DP - Empirical Risk Optimization (ERM). Various works address the problem of ERM (similar
to our setup §2.1), through the lens of differential privacy. Table 1 compares the utility bounds between
DP-SCD and representative works for each perturbation method for DP-ERM. We simplify the bounds
following [26] for easier comparison. The assumptions of these methods, described in [26, Table 1] and §4,
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Table 1: Comparison of utility bounds of (, δ)-DP algorithms for empirical risk minimization.
Method Perturbation Method Utility Bound
[29] Output O ( mN22 )
[6,7] Inner (objective) O ( mN22 )
[26] Inner (update) O
(
m·log(N)
N22
)
DP-SCD Inner (update) O
(
L3·log(N/L)
N22
)
are similar4. We highlight that the bound for DP-SCD is independent of the dimensionality of the problem
(m) due to the dual updates, while also incorporates the mini-batch size (L) for quantifying the impact of
the varying degree of parallelism.
Existing DP-ERM methods based on SGD typically require the tuning of an additional hyperparameter
(learning rate or step size) similar to DP-SGD [1]. The value of this hyperparameter for certain loss functions
can be set based on properties of these functions [28]. Furthermore regarding [28], the authors build upon
permutation-based SGD and employ output perturbation, but tolerate only a constant number of iterations.
Coordinate descent. SCD algorithms do not require parameter tuning if they update one coordinate (or
block) at a time, by exact minimization (or Taylor approximation). One such algorithm is SDCA [22] that
is similar to DP-SCD when setting →∞, L = 1 and C →∞. Alternative SCD algorithms take a gradient
step in the coordinate direction that requires a step size [3,16].
Parallelizable variants of SCD (such as [5,20]) have shown remarkable speedup when deployed on multiple
CPUs/GPUs [8,14,19,21,30], or multiple machines [11,15]. These works employ sampling to select the data
to be updated in parallel. DP-SCD also employs sampling via the mini-batch size (L), similar to the lot size
of DP-SGD [1], to (a) enable parallel updates and (b) steer the privacy-utility trade-off. DP-SCD is also
similar to CoCoA [15] with K = L and T local = 1. A first differentiation is that each ∆j is computed on a
single example and not on a partition of the dataset (Pj) when split among K workers. A second one is the
noise addition after each CoCoA update (Steps 12 and 13 of Algorithm 1) that is necessary for differential
privacy.
7 Conclusion
This paper introduces the first differentially private stochastic coordinate descent algorithm (DP-SCD).
We formally derive its privacy bounds and study the convergence. We show that the dual formulation of
DP-SCD is preferable over the primal due to the difference in the sensitive data access patterns. We empir-
ically compare DP-SCD against a popular SGD alternative (DP-SGD) under the same privacy guarantees.
DP-SCD has a better privacy-utility trade-off than DP-SGD for ridge regression and SVMs, while DP-SCD
also requires less hyperparameter tuning than DP-SGD.
Our work is only a first step towards differentially private machine learning based on coordinate descent.
We empirically confirm our theoretical result by showing that convergence is achieved despite the presence
of noise. The convergence rate of DP-SCD is comparable to the one of DP-SGD and we plan to also study
it theoretically.
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